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(i) 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, petitioner, Tasters Ltd. Inc., ("Tasters"), respectfully 
petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for a rehearing with respect 
to the Court's decision, dated June 19, 1991, in the 
above-referenced matter. 
BACKGROUND 
This proceeding was initiated by Tasters seeking review 
of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission's (the 
"Board") decision which held certain individuals to be employees 
of Tasters. In its Brief before the Court, Tasters raised the 
issue of whether the Board erred in interpreting or construing 
the law under Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(T) in determin-
ing employee status. Tasters argued that the correction-of-error 
standard applied in this case as the issue dealt with the propri-
ety of the Board's construction of a statute; i.e., a legal 
issue. On June 19, 1991, this Court issued its Opinion in the 
above-captioned matter, concluding that the Board's application 
of Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5) to the factual findings in this 
matter did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rational-
ity, and that its factual findings were supported by the substan-
tial evidence. In reaching this conclusion, this Court rejected 
the correction of error standard, and followed an intermediate 
standard of review. 
ARGUMENT 
Based on a recent opinion by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Morton International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 
900325 (filed June 24, 1991) ("Morton"), (see Appendix A attached 
hereto) Tasters respectfully submits that the Court should apply 
the correction-of-error standard, without giving any deference to 
the Board's prior decision in reviewing the correctness of the 
Board's construction of the applicable statutory provisions. 
Beginning on page 5 of the Morton decision, the Supreme 
Court provides a detailed discussion of the applicable standards 
of review of agency decisions. More specifically, on page 7 of 
the decision, the Supreme Court indicates that it has not always 
been clear when the intermediate standard of review or correc-
tion-of-error standard of review should be used in reviewing 
agency decisions. By example, the Court cited to Bennett v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986) (correc-
tion of error standard used to review Industrial Commission's 
interpretation of "employee") and Pinter Construction Corp. v. 
Frisby, 678 P.2d 3 05, 3 07 (Utah 1984) (intermediate standard used 
to review Industrial Commission's interpretation of "employee.") 
On page 8 of the decision, the Supreme Court clarifies this past 
confusion by indicating what is the dispositive factor in decid-
ing whether correction-of-error or intermediate standard of 
review is applicable. The Supreme Court stated: 
-2-
[W]hat has developed as the dispositive fac-
tor is whether the agency, by virtue of its 
experience or expertise, is in a better posi-
tion than the courts to give effect to the 
regulatory objective to be achieved. 
Id. at 8, citing in part to Bennett. The Supreme Court then went 
on to state: 
We do not defer to the Commission when con-
struing statutory terms or when applying 
statutory terms to the facts unless the con-
struction of the statutory language or the 
application of the law to the facts should be 
subject to the Commission's expertise gleaned 
from its accumulated practical, first-hand 
experience with the subject matter. 
Id., citing Bennett. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has set forth that a correc-
tion-of-error standard will apply unless the agency has a certain 
level of expertise vis-a-vis the issue at hand putting the agency 
in a position better than the courts to resolve the issue. 
Therefore, in this case, the dispositive question is whether the 
Board has a level of expertise in determining "employee" status 
under the applicable statute. The Supreme Court has already 
answered this question in the negative, concluding the Board does 
not have any expertise in the construction of a statute determin-
ing employee status. In Bennett, the Supreme Court was asked to 
review the Board's determination of whether a worker was an 
"employee" within the meaning of the Workman's Compensation Laws 
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which required the application of statutory standards to given 
facts. In that case, the Supreme Court stated: 
Since resolution of the issue is not bene-
fited by Commission expertise or experience, 
we do not defer to the Commissions ruling. 
Bennett at 429. 
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has 
indicated that on legal issues, the determination as to whether a 
correction-of-error standard applies is based, in part, upon the 
experience or expertise of the agency, and the Supreme Court has 
specifically held that with respect to the issue of the classifi-
cation of an individual as an employee, that the resolution of 
that issue is not benefited by the Boards expertise or experi-
ence, and therefore the court will not defer to the Commission's 
rulings. 
The Supreme Court summarized the applicable standard of 
review, as follows: 
Therefore, in cases dealing with statu-
tory construction, the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act does not change the standard of 
review when the court is in as good a posi-
tion as the agency to determine the issue or 
when the agency has been granted discretion 
in interpreting the statute. However, noth-
ing in the language of section 63-46b-16 or 
its legislative history suggests that an 
agency's decision is entitled to deference 
solely on the basis of agency expertise or 
experience. Indeed, there is no reference to 
agency expertise or experience in the statute 
or the statute's legislative history. 
Rather, in granting judicial relief when an 
"agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law/ the language of section 
63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a 
grant of discretion, a correction-of-error 
standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory 
term. Therefore, to the extent that our 
cases can be read as granting deference to an 
agency's decisions based solely on the agen-
cy's expertise and not on a statutory delega-
tion of authority, section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) 
constitutes a break from prior law. 
[Footnotes omitted]. Morton p. 10. 
The opinion of the Court in the present case conflicts 
with the standard review as described by the Supreme Court in 
Morton. This Court appears to classify the Board's application 
of § 35-4-22(j) (5) to the Board's factual finding as involving 
mixed questions of law and fact and does not disturb the Board's 
decision because the Court concluded the Board's decision did not 
exceed bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Morton holds 
that a correction of error standard is used in reviewing an agen-
cy's interpretation or application of a statutory term. There-
fore, this court's conclusion at page 7 that Tasters had a burden 
to show that the Board's application did not exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness is contrary to the requirement of Morton that this 
court should review and correct error and the agency should not 
be granted any deference. 
-5-
CONCLUSION 
Based on the Supreme Court's past decision in Bennett, 
concluding that the Board has no expertise in construing 
statutory provisions, and that the Court is in as good a position 
as the agency to review the statute, and based upon the repeated 
citations to Bennett as controlling in the Morton decision, Tast-
ers asserts that this Court should apply a correction of error 
standard in reviewing the Board's decision in the above-captioned 
matter. Testers request the court to review this case applying 
the correction of error standard. 
The undersigned counsel for Tasters hereby certifies 
that this Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this _3 day of July, 1991. 
C^^ GARY E. Dj&CTORMAN " 
RICHARD )&. MARSH 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX "A" 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Morton International, Inc., No. 900325 
Petitioner, 
F I L E D 
v . June 2 4 , 1991 
Auditing Division of the 
Utah State Tax Commission, 
Respondent. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Randy M. Grimshaw, Maxwell A. Miller, Richard M. 
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Morton International 
R. Paul Van Dam, Brian Tarbet, Salt Lake City, for 
State Tax Commission 
HALL, ChiQf Justice: 
Petitioner Morton International, Inc. ("Morton"), 
seeks review of the determination of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("the Commission**) that certain expenditures made 
in the construction of facilities used in the production of 
sodium azide pellets and igniter material ('•production 
facilities") are not exempt from sales and use tax under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) or (16) (Supp. 1987). 
The facts underlying Morton's claims are not in 
dispute. In 1987, Morton began construction of facilities 
used in the production of sodium azide pellets and igniter 
material, which are components of the crash protection airbag 
system used in motor vehicles. The pellets and igniter 
material are inserted into small pressure vessels to form 
airbag inflaters. When the pellet is ignited, it generates 
nitrogen gas, which rapidly inflates the airbag. Morton has 
manufactured sodium azide pellets for over a decade. The new 
facilities, however, constitute a significant expansion of 
this business. 
The process of manufacturing sodium azide pellets 
and igniter material is unigue and highly specialized. The 
chemicals used in the process are extremely energetic, 
explosive, and toxic. Accordingly, the facilities were 
specifically designed to incorporate safety and environmental 
features and support specialized and massive equipment, some 
of which is suspended above the floor. For example, separate 
facilities were built for each stage of production. This was 
done to minimize the risk to personnel, machinery, and equip-
ment in case of fire, explosion, or chemical contaminant 
reactions. There are also many environmental features that 
are incorporated into the buildings themselves, such as, heavy 
metal free areas, special conductive flooring, protective 
blast and blowout walls and ceilings, chemical dust collection 
filters, and protected double-walled piping and sumps. Many 
of the production areas are operated by remote control. 
Personnel only enter for maintenance and quality control. Due 
to the toxic nature of the materials, personnel are not 
allowed in these areas without protective clothing, including 
respirators. 
On June 26, 1989, Morton initiated this action. By 
stipulation, it was agreed that the action would be treated as 
a request for refund and formal hearing. A hearing was held 
on March 7, 1990. At the hearing, Morton represented that 
since 1987, it had paid an excess of $325,000 in sales and use 
taxes with respect to the construction of its sodium azide 
pellet production facilities. Morton contended that it was 
entitled to a refund of sales and use taxes pursuant to 
section 59-12-104(15) on the ground that the production 
facilities were a "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading 
plant" and, alternatively, pursuant to section 59-12-104(16), 
on the ground that the production facilities function as, and 
essentially are, "equipment." On June 7, 1990, the Commission 
issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final 
decision determining that the fuel pellets were not a 
synthetic fuel and thus the production facilities did not 
qualify for an exemption under section 59-12-104(15). The 
Commission also determined that Morton's production facilities 
were real property and thus the sale of materials used in 
construction of the production facilities did not constitute 
the sale of equipment under section 59-12-104(16). 
On July 27, 1990, Morton filed this petition for 
review. The general issue before this court is whether the 
Commission erred in concluding that the sale of certain 
materials used in the construction of Morton's production 
facilities is not exempt from sales and use tax under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) or (16). 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
h* Administrative Procedure Act 
The instant case was initiated after January 1, 1988, 
and the Commission's decision was reached following a formal 
hearing. Therefore, the applicable standard of review of the 
Commission's action is set out in the Utah Administrative 
No. 900325 2 
Procedure Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16f1 which provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) As provided by statute, the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency 
action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant 
relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion 
delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the 
agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's 
prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious. 
The Commission maintains that section 63-46b-16(4) 
grants agencies greater discretion than they had under prior 
case law. This argument is based on the language in section 
63-46b-16(4) stating that appellate relief can only be 
T. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 (1987) provides: 
"(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and 
judicial review contained in this chapter are applicable to 
all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before an 
agency on and after January 1, 1988." 
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granted if "on the basis of the agency's record- the appellate 
court determines that a person has been -substantially 
prejudiced.- We have always based our decisions on the 
agency's record. Therefore, this requirement does not disturb 
prior case law.2 Furthermore, section 63-46b-16(4) deals 
with judicial relief, not judicial review. It is clear from 
this language that this section does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an agency's decision.3 
Rather, section 64-46b-16(4) ensures that relief should not be 
granted when, although the agency committed error, the error 
was harmless. Indeed, the language of section 63-46b-16(4) is 
similar to language in rules of procedure and evidence dealing 
with harmless error.4 Given this similarity in language, we 
conclude that the legislature in enacting section 63-46b-16(4) 
intended that the same standard used for determining the 
harmfulness of error in appeals from judicial proceedings 
should apply to reviews of agency actions. Under this 
standard, an error will be harmless if it is -sufficiently 
inconsequential that . . . there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.-5 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h), however, 
incorporates standards that appellate courts are to employ 
when reviewing allegations of agency error.6 Morton's 
2. 5fi£ Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec, 
657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); see also Comments of the Utah 
Administrative Law Advisory Committee, Utah A.P.A. at 15 (Code 
Co Law Publishers, April 25, 1988) [hereinafter Advisory 
Committee]. 
3. The comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory 
Committee state that section 63-46b-16(4) is patterned after 
comparable provisions of the Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act (-MSAPA-). See Model State Admin. Procedure Act 
§ 5-116, 15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981). Section 5-116 of the 
MSAPA requires the showing of substantial prejudice for an 
appellate court to grant relief. It is clear from reading the 
comments to section 5-116 that the requirement of substantial 
prejudice does not require appellate courts to grant 
administrative agencies deference. Indeed, the comments state 
that appellate courts "may decide that the agency has 
erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely disagrees 
with the agency's interpretation.-
4. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a). 
5. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). In a case 
such as the instant case, where we reject the argument that an 
agency has erred, this provision has no application. 
6. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted section 
63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h) as establishing standards of 
review that differ, in some cases, from our prior case law. 
5££ Grace Drilling Co, v, Board of Review, 776 p.2d 63, 66-68 
(Continued on page 5.) 
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claims are based on subsections 63-46b-16(4)(d), (4)(h)(iii), 
and (4)(h)(iv). The question presented, therefore, is whether 
the standard of review incorporated into these subsections 
differs from the standard of review developed in our prior 
case law. 
B. Prior Case Law 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act, the Utah courts developed three levels of 
review in connection with agency action. First, agencies* 
findings of fact were granted considerable deference and would 
not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial 
evidence.7 Second, a correction-of-error standard, giving 
no deference to agencies* decisions, was used to review 
agencies* rulings on issues the court characterized as 
concerning general law.8 Examples of issues characterized 
as questions of general law include rulings concerning 
constitutional questions,9 rulings concerning the agency's 
(Footnote 6 continued.) 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (different standard for reviewing agency 
action based on determination of fact); see also Advisory 
Committee at 15; MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at 
127-30. But see Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 
P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (same standard for 
applying the law). We note that the analysis used in 
Pro-Benefit is inconsistent with the analysis expressed in 
this opinion. 
7. Sfifi/ e.g., Savage Indus. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 
160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (1991); Hurlev v. Board of Review. 767 
P.2d 524, 526 (Utah 1988); Bennett v. Indus. Comm'n, 726 P.2d 
427, 429 (Utah 1986); Bio K Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 689 
P.2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 1984). See also section 63-46b-16(4)(g) 
of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that 
a party who is substantially prejudiced by an agency action 
can seek judicial relief on the ground that "the agency action 
is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." 
8. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; Utah Pep *t of 
Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 
1983) . 
9. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; Utah Pep' t of 
Admint Serv,, 658 P.2d at 608; R.W. Jones Trucking v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n. 649 P.2d 628, 629 (Utah 1982). See also Utah 
Administrative Procedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(a), which 
provides that a party who is substantially prejudiced by an 
agency action may seek judicial relief on the ground that "the 
agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency 
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied." 
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jurisdiction or statutory authority,10 rulings concerning 
common law principles such as the interpretation of contracts 
and certificates,-*-1 and rulings concerning interpretation 
of statutes unrelated to the agency*12 
The correction-of-error standard was also used to 
review an agency's construction of, or application of the 
findings of fact to, the statutes which the agency is 
empowered to administer—when the agency's experience or 
expertise is not helpful in resolving the issue.13 One 
example of such a situation is when a question of statutory 
interpretation turns on basic legislative intent.14 Other 
examples include situations where the agency is construing 
ordinary statutory terms within the statutes which they 
administer, such as, application of limitation period under 
the workers' compensation act,15 and the proper construc-
tion of the term -deficiency of service."16 In fact, in 
any situation involving the application of the legal rules 
to the findings of fact, a correction-of-error standard is 
used if the court is as well-suited to determine the issue 
as the agency.17 
10. Sfifi# e.g. , Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 608; 
Utah Cable Television Operator Ass'n vt Pvblic Serv, Comnrn, 
656 P.2d 398, 402-03 (Utah 1982). See also Utah 
Administrative Procedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(b), which 
provides that a party who is substantially prejudiced by an 
agency action can seek judicial relief on the ground that Hthe 
agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute." 
11. SSSL Utah Pep't of Admin, Servt/ 658 P.2d at 608; w,s, 
Hatch Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809, 
811 (Utah 1954). But see Savage grost inc, vt Public Sery, 
Comm'n, 723 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (interpretation of 
certificate of public convenience granted deference when 
agency's expertise is helpful in interpreting ambiguous and 
technical terms). 
12. See generally Huxley/ 767 p.2d at 527; Bennett/ 726 P.2d 
at 429. Both cases state that no deference is granted to an 
agency's interpretation of statutes or application of 
statutory terms to factual situations unless the agency, by 
virtue of its expertise, is in a better position to give 
effect to the regulatory objective. 
13. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at 
429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353. 
14. See Hurlev, 767 P.2d at 527; Bio K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 
1353. 
15. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779, 782 
(Utah 1984). 
16. Big K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 1353. 
17. See, e.g.. Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at 
429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353. 
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Finally, an intermediate standard of review, granting 
some deference to the agency's decisions, has been used when 
the agency's experience or expertise puts the agency in a 
better position to resolve issues concerning the application 
of findings of fact to the legal rules governing the case and 
the interpretations of the operative provisions of the 
statutes the agency is empowered to administer.18 This 
standard was also used when it was alleged that the agency 
abused the discretion granted to it by statute.19 Under the 
intermediate standard of review, appellate courts did not 
disturb an agency's decision if the decision was within the 
bounds of reasonableness.20 
In cases not involving discretion, it has not 
always been clear when the intermediate standard of review 
should be used.21 In some early cases, we characterized 
the issues that are appropriate for the intermediate standard 
of review as questions of mixed fact and law22 or, 
alternatively, as questions concerning the application of 
the law.23 However, issues that are appropriate for the 
intermediate standard have also been described as questions 
18. SfifiL/ e.g., Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; 
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional HQSP. v. Board of 
Review, 723 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1986); Savage Byps, InC, 
723 p.2d at 1087; garney v> Department of Employment Sect, 681 
P.2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984). 
19. SS£, e.g., Big K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 1353; Salt fraKe City 
Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec. 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 
(Utah 1982). 
20. See, e.g., Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; 
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional HQSP., 723 P.2d at 
428-29; Utah Deo't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610. 
21. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. Compare 
Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429 (correction-of-error standard used to 
review Industrial Commission's interpretation of "employee") 
with Pinter Constr. Corp. v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah 
1984) (intermediate standard used to review Industrial 
Commission's interpretation of "employee"). 
22. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional HQSP., 
723 P.2d at 429; Gray v. Department of Employment Sec, 681 
P.2d 807, 810 (Utah 1984); Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 
P.2d at 610. 
23. Mixed questions of fact and law have been defined as 
"•the "application" of the findings of basic fact (e.g., what 
happened) to the legal rules governing the case.'" Gray, 681 
P.2d at 811 n.7 (quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d 
at 610). This court has used the terms mixed question of fact 
and law and application of the law interchangeably. See 
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527-28; Logan Regional Hosp.. 723 P.2d at 
429; Bgrney, 681 P.2d at 1275; Clearfield Citv v. Department 
of Employment Sec., 663 P.2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 1983). 
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of statutory construction,24 questions of special law,25 
and questions of law.26 Indeed, we have stated, "An 
agency's interpretation of key provisions of the statute that 
it is empowered to administer is often inseparable from its 
application of the rules of law to the basic facts."27 
A review of our recent cases, however, makes it clear 
that it is not the characterization of an issue as a mixed 
question of fact and law or the characterization of the issue 
as a question of general law that is dispositive of the 
determination of the appropriate level of judicial review. 
Rather, what has developed as the dispositive factor is 
whether the agency, by virtue of its experience or expertise, 
is in a better position than the courts to give effect to the 
regulatory objective to be achieved*28 We have stated: 
We do not defer to the Commission when 
construing statutory terms or when applying 
statutory terms to the facts unless the 
construction of the statutory language or 
the application of the law to the facts 
should be subject to the Commission's 
expertise gleaned from its accumulated 
practical, first-hand experience with the 
subject matter.29 
A clear example of this principle can be seen in Savage 
Brothers Inc. v. Public Service Commission.30 There, we 
noted that questions involving interpretations of certificates 
of public convenience and necessity ordinarily involve 
questions of general law. However, we held that when an 
agency has specialized knowledge that is helpful in 
interpreting ambiguous and technical terms of a certificate, 
an intermediate standard of review is appropriate.31 
In determining whether the standards of review 
incorporated in subsections 63-46b-16(4)(d), (4)(h)(iii), and 
(4)(h)(iv) differ from the standards established in our 
24. 3££ Chris & Dick's v. State Tax Comm'n. 791 P.2d 511, 
513-14 (Utah 1990); Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp., 689 
P.2d at 1353; Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610. 
25. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610. 
26. Sfifi Chris & Dick's. 791 P.2d at 513-14; Hurley. 767 P.2d 
at 527; Bennett. 726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 
1353; Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610. 
27. Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610. 
28. Savage Indus,, 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6; Chris & Dick's. 
791 P.2d at 513-14; Hurley. 767 P.2d at 527; Bfennett, 726 P.2d 
at 429; Bio K Corp.. 689 P.2d at 1353. 
29. Bennett. 726 P.2d at 429. 
30. 723 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
31. JAJU at 1087. 
No. 900325 8 
prior case law, we will address each section separately in 
the context of the claim raised under that section, 
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
At Section 63-46b-3.6(4)(d> 
Morton's claim that it is entitled to judicial 
relief under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) is based on the 
allegation that the Commission erred in its construction of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) and (16) or in its 
application of these subsections to the findings of fact. 
Under our prior case law, the standard used to review the 
Commission's determinations would be a^correction-of-error 
standard unless the Commission was granted—sottief discretion in 
dealing with the issue or, by virtue-of^ its expertise or 
experience, was in a superior position to decide the issue. 
The first question presented, therefore, is whether section 
63-46b-16(4) departs from this standard. 
It has already been established that in some 
situations, the standard of review provided in section 
63-46b-16(4)(d) is identical to the standard of review in our 
prior case law. In Savage Industries Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission.32 we held that under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), a 
correction-of-error standard, giving no deference to the 
agency decisions, is to be used in cases involving statutory" 
construction where the court is in as good a position as the 
agency to interpret the statute.33 This holding was based 
on the term "erroneous," which connotes a correction-of-error 
standard,34 and the legislative history of section 
63-46b-16(4)(d), which implies that "•a court may decide that 
the agency has erroneously interpreted the law if the court 
merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation.•*35 
Similarly, section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) provides for judicial 
relief in cases where the agency has abused the '•discretion 
delegated to the agency by statute."36 In past cases, we 
32. 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7-8 (Utah 1991). 
33. JAJU at 7. 
34. IiL. at 8. 
35. JJL. at 8 (citing MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at 
128 (1981)). 
36. The legislative history of section 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
also supports this position. The comments of the Utah 
Administrative Procedure Act state that section 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
is patterned after comparable provisions in the MSAPA. The 
comments to the relevant section of the MSAPA state that "the 
enabling statute normally confers some discretion upon the 
agency. Accordingly, a court should find reversible error in 
the agency's application of the law only if the agency has 
improperly exercised its discretion." See MSAPA § 5-116, 
comments, 15 U.L.A. at 128. 
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have held that an agency has abused its discretion when the 
agency's action, viewed in the context of the language and 
purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable.37 
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory 
construction, ^ the Utah Administrative Procedure Act does not 
change the standard of review when the court is in as good a 
position as the agency to determine the issue or when the 
agency has been granted discretion in interpreting the 
statute. However, nothing in the language of section 
63-46b-16 or its legislative history suggests that an agency's 
decision is entitled to deference solely on the basis of 
agency expertise or experience. Indeed, there is no reference 
to agency expertise or experience in the statute or the 
statute's legislative history. Rather, in granting judicial 
relief when an "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law,- the language of section 63-46b-16(4) clearly 
indicates that absent a grant of discretion, a correction-
of-error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory term.38 
Therefore, to the extent that our cases can be read as 
granting deference to an agency's decisions based solely on 
the agency's expertise and not on a statutory delegation of 
authority, section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) constitutes a break from 
prior law.39 
37. See Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Department of Employment 
Sec. 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); West Jordan v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 656 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1982); 
Gf^ Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 611-12 (Utah 1983). Focusing on the legislative 
grant of authority is important in determining whether an 
agency has abused its discretion. The court should be careful 
not to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency 
when considering the wisdom of the agency's policies. See 
Advisory Committee at 15; see also MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 
15 U.L.A. at 128 (1981). 
38. As noted supra in notes 21-27 and accompanying text, in 
some of our earlier cases, in determining that an intermediate 
standard of review is appropriate, we have relied upon the 
characterization of an issue as an application of the law as 
opposed to an interpretation of the law. Although in our more 
recent cases the focus has turned to agency expertise, the 
fact that the Administrative Procedure Act incorporates the 
terms "application of the law" and "interpretation of the law" 
under a single standard supports the contention that absent a 
grant of discretion, an agency's interpretation or application 
of statutory terms should be reviewed for error. 
39. In fact, the legislative history of the Administrative 
Procedure Act suggests that the legislature intended to alter 
the approach the courts developed to review agency action. 
See Sullivan, Overview of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, Utah A.P.A. at 4-5 (Code Co Publishers July 8, 1988). 
No. 900325 10 
This, however, may not have a significant effect on 
the standard used to review agencies* statutory interpretations 
and applications of their own statutes• In many cases where 
we would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of 
its expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency 
deference on.the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of 
discretion contained in the governing statute. 
The legislature, in many instances, has explicitly 
granted agencies discretion in dealing with specific statutory 
terms.40 Apart from such explicit grants of authority, 
courts have also recognized that grants of discretion may be 
implied from the statutory language. For example, we have 
held that when the operative terms of a statute are broad and 
generalized, these terms "bespeak a legislative intent to 
delegate their interpretation to the responsible agency.-41 
We have also granted an agency's statutory interpretation 
deference when the statutory language suggested that the 
legislature had left the specific question at issue 
unresolved. In Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Confer.42 we held 
that an agency's interpretation of statutory provisions is 
entitled to deference when there is more than one permis-
sible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory 
language or the legislative history to prefer one interpre-
tation over another.4^ 
The approach used in Salt Lake Citv Corp. is 
consistent with section 63-46b-16. Questions of legislative 
intent are considered questions of law, which are reviewed for 
correctness under our prior case law44 and section 
63-46b-16(4)(d). Therefore, when a legislative intent 
concerning the specific question at issue can be derived 
through traditional methods of statutory construction, the 
agency's interpretation will be granted no deference and the 
statute will be interpreted in accord with its legislative 
40. For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides for "sales or 
leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding 
normal operating replacements . . . as determined by the 
commission). * (Emphasis added.) 
41. Utah Deo't of Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 610; see also 
Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 657 P.2d at 1316-17 (term "equity and 
good conscience*1 confers broad discretion) . 
42. 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983). 
43. Id. at 636. The United States Supreme Court has recently 
adopted a similar approach. &&£ Dole v. United Steelworkers 
of America. 494 U.S. 26, , 110 S. Ct. 929, 938 (1990); 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 467 U.S. 
837, 841 (1984). 
44. See Savage Indus., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, 8; Hurlev v. 
Board of Review. 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
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intent.45 However, in the absence of a discernible 
legislative intent concerning the specific question in issue, 
a choice among permissible interpretations of a statute is 
largely a policy determination. The agency that has been 
granted authority to administer the statute is the appropriate 
body to make -such a determination.46 Indeed, both the 
legislative history to section 63-46b-1647 and our prior 
cases48 suggest that an appellate court should not substi-
tute its judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the 
wisdom of the agency's policy. When there is no discern-
ible legislative intent concerning a specific issue the 
legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In 
such a case, it is appropriate to conclude that the legisla-
ture has delegated authority to the agency to decide the 
issue. Such an approach is particularly appropriate when it 
is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended the 
agency to have some discretion in dealing with the statutory 
provision at issue. 
We do not mean to suggest that these are the only 
methods of determining whether the legislature has granted the 
agency discretion in dealing with an issue. However, it is 
clear from the wording of section 63-46b-16 that an agency's 
statutory construction should only be given deference when 
there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the 
language in question, either expressly made in the statute or 
implied from the statutory language. 
B, Section 59-12-104(15) 
Morton's first argument is that the sale of certain 
materials, machinery, and equipment used in the construction 
of its production facilities is exempt from sales and use tax 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), which provides: 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from taxes imposed by this chapter: 
(15) sales or leases of materials, 
machinery, equipment, and services of any 
person in excess of $500,000 for any tax 
year used in the new construction, 
45. See Savage Indus.. 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8; Hurley. 767 
P.2d at 527. 
46. Sfifi Salt Lake Citv Corp., 674 P.2d at 636; Utah Dep't of 
Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 611. 
47. See Advisory Committee at 15; see also MSAPA § 5-116, 
comments, 15 U.L.A. at 128. ~~~ 
48. See Salt Lake Citv Corp., 674 P.2d at 636; Utah Deo't of 
Admin. Serv,, 658 P.2d at 611. 
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expansion, or modernization (excluding 
normal operating replacements as 
determined by the commission) of any mine, 
mill, reduction works, smelter, refinery 
(except oil and gas refineries), synthetic 
fuel processing and upgrading plant, 
rolling mill, coal washing plant, or 
melting facility in Utah commencing after 
July 1, 1984, and ending June 30, 1989.49 
Morton argues that the sodium azide pellets are synthetic 
fuels and that, therefore, Morton's facilities constitute a 
-synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant- as that term 
is used in section 59-12-104(15). 
The question presented is one of statutory 
construction or application, and absent a grant of discretion, 
the Commission's decision will be reviewed under a correction-
of-error standard. The statutory terms in question are of a 
specific nature and do not connote a general grant of discre-
tion. Furthermore, the precise issue presented, whether 
facilities such as those in question can be considered 
synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plants, can be 
resolved through the use of traditional rules of statutory 
construction.5" It is apparent that the Commission has not 
been granted any discretion in regard to the present issue. 
Therefore, its interpretation will not be given deference. 
Morton's interpretation of section 59-12-104(15) is 
based on the well-established rule of statutory construction 
that a statutory term should be interpreted and applied 
according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary 
meaning of the term results in an application that is neither 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction 
of the express purpose of the statute.51 It is argued that 
the usual meaning of the term -synthetic,- as defined by 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, is -relating to or 
involving synthesis; produced artificially; man-made.- The 
usual meaning of the term -fuel,- according to Webster's, is a 
-material used to produce heat or power by burning.- Morton 
then combines these definitions to produce an interpretation 
of the term -synthetic fuel- as -a man-made fuel that could be 
combusted or consumed to produce heat or light.- Under such 
an interpretation of section 59-12-104(15), the sodium azide 
pellets would qualify as a synthetic fuel. 
49. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (emphasis added). 
50. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. 
51. West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982); 
See 3lSQ Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake 
City/ 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); Gord v. Salt Lake Cityr 
20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1967). 
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While the analysis used in reaching this point 
ignores other relevant and well-established rules of statutory 
construction, it is not necessary to rely on other rules of 
construction to conclude that Mortons interpretation is 
erroneous. This is because the rule cited for Morton's 
interpretation does not support its position. First, it is 
apparent from the record that there is no usual and accepted 
meaning of the term -synthetic fuel." Testimony at the 
hearing established that there is conflict within the 
scientific community concerning the accepted meaning of the 
term. Indeed, in several points in its brief, Morton claims 
that there is confusion concerning the accepted meaning of the 
term "synthetic fuel." Though we have relied on dictionary 
definitions to determine the usual meaning of statutory terms, 
the term "synthetic fuel" is not defined in the dictionary. 
When it is admitted that there is no accepted meaning of the 
statutory term at issue, a method of construction which is 
based solely on one of many possible definitions is 
inappropriate. 
Second, even assuming that Morton's definition is 
appropriate, the argument necessarily fails because Morton 
misapplies the rule. Morton argues that despite the confusion 
as to the meaning of -synthetic fuel,- the term should be 
defined by combining the strict dictionary definitions of 
-synthetic- and -fuel.- Under such a definition, any man-made 
material capable of burning would qualify as a synthetic 
fuel. Taking Morton's analysis one step further, any facility 
that produces a material capable of burning would qualify as a 
-synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant.- Morton 
attempts to avoid such a result by arguing that a requirement 
not found in the definition of either -synthetic" or "fuel"— 
the requirement that it must be economical to produce heat or 
energy from a man-made material—should be read into the 
definition of "synthetic fuel." Morton claims that such an 
interpretation is justified in order to avoid absurd results. 
This argument, however, is a misstatement of the very rule 
upon which Morton relies. When the use of an ordinary meaning 
of a statutory term results in a statute that is "confused 
beyond reason,"52 the court does not resolve the confusion 
by modifying the ordinary meaning of the term. Rather, in 
such cases the method of construction urged by Morton is not 
employed.53 
However, other methods of construction can be used to 
determine the application of the phrase "synthetic fuel 
processing and upgrading plant" when the meaning of the phrase 
cannot be arrived at through use of the usual meaning of the 
term. One such method of statutory construction is the rule 
52. Gord, 434 P.2d at 451. 
53. See Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist.. 659 P.2d at 
1035; Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord, 434 P.2d at 451. 
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of noscitur a sociis, which provides that the meaning of 
questionable words and phrases in a statute be ascertained by 
reference to words or phrases associated with them.54 The 
terms surrounding "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading 
plant" all relate to different aspects of the mining or 
material reclamation operations. This suggests that the term 
"synthetic fuel upgrading and processing plant" should be 
interpreted in accordance with the term's relationship to the 
mining industry. Such an approach is also consistent with the 
legislative history of section 59-12-104(15). Both Morton and 
the Commission assert that the legislative history reveals 
that section 59-12-104(15) was enacted to aid Utah's ailing 
mining industry. 
At the hearing, Dr. Wiser, a professor of fuel 
engineering at the University of Utah, offered a definition of 
"synthetic fuel processing and upgrading plant" that is 
consistent with the language and legislative history of 
section 59-12-104(15). Dr. Wiser stated that in the synthetic 
fuel industry, the term "synthetic fuel processing and 
upgrading plant" refers to a plant which produces a liquid 
material that can be further refined into a synthetic fuel by 
removing the impurities from raw materials other than 
petroleum and natural gas, such as coal, tar sands, oil shale, 
and organic waste. Dr. Wiser further testified that a 
synthetic fuel is a liquid or gaseous material produced from 
such raw materials used in combustion primarily for the 
production of energy. The requirement that a synthetic fuel 
be gaseous or liquid is linked to the purpose of developing 
synthetic fuels, which is to take the pressure off of 
petroleum and natural gas and to reduce dependence on foreign 
oil. 
This definition, to the extent that it focuses on 
mined materials such as coal, tar sands, and oil shale, is 
consistent with the language and legislative history of 
section 59-12-104(15). Because the definition offered by 
Dr. Wiser focuses on "processing and upgrading plant" as well 
as "synthetic fuel," it is also consistent with the rule of 
statutory construction which provides that terms of a statute 
are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a 
piecemeal fashion.55 It should also be noted that this 
narrow definition limits the exception granted under section 
59-12-104(15). Therefore, the approach suggested by Dr. Wiser 
54. Sfift Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839, 840 
(1962); W.S. Hatch Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 3 Utah 2d 7, 
277 P.2d 809, 812 (1954); Perris v. Perris. 115 Utah 128, 202 
P.2d 731, 733 (1949); see also Dole, 494 U.S. at , 110 S. 
Ct. at 935. 
55. Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); Peay 
vt Bpgrd gf Educt Qt ProvQ City Schools, 14 Utah 2d 63, 377 
P.2d 490, 492 (1962). 
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is consistent with the well-established principle that tax 
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against the 
party claiming the exemption and all ambiguities are to be 
resolved in favor of taxation,56 
There is ample support from the wording of the 
statute, the statute's legislative history, and other methods 
of statutory construction to conclude that the legislature, in 
enacting section 59-12-104(15), intended to grant an exemption 
for materials used in the construction of the type of plant 
Dr. Wiser described: that is, a plant which removes 
impurities from natural resources such as coal, oil shale, and 
tar sands to produce a liquid or gaseous material meant to be 
used in combustion for the production of energy. It is also 
clear that given this construction, Morton's production 
facilities do not qualify as a synthetic fuel processing and 
upgrading plant. The Commission, therefore, did not err in 
determining that the materials used in the construction of 
Morton's facilities do not qualify for an exemption under 
section 59-12-104(15). 
C. Section 59-12-104(16) 
Morton argues that the shells of its production 
facilities, i.e., the foundations, walls, floors, and 
ceilings, constitute equipment. Therefore, the construction 
of the facilities constitutes a purchase of equipment under " 
59-12-104(16), which provides: 
The following sales and use are exempt from 
taxes imposed by the chapter: 
(16) sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they 
may increase plant production or capacity, 
as determined by the commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah.-*7 
Morton's argument is based on the assertion that the shells 
of its production facilities function as equipment by 
56. Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 
P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980); Great Salt Lake Minerals v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake County v. 
Tax copun'n, Utah ex rei, good Shepherd Lutheran Church, 54 8 
P.2d 630, 631 (Utah 1976). 
57. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (emphasis added). 
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preventing, localizing, and directing accidental explosions, 
preventing toxic exposure to workers and the environment, 
providing structural support for specialized pieces of 
machinery, and providing access to machinery. The Commission 
rejected this argument, determining that the facilities 
constitute real property not subject to an exemption under 
section 59-12-104(16). 
The specific issue presented on appeal, therefore, 
is whether the term "equipment," as used in section 
59-12-104(16), refers to structures that have character-
istics of improvements to real property, but also have 
characteristics of equipment in that they provide safety 
features, support for machinery, and access to machinery. 
This is a question of statutory construction or application 
and absent a grant of discretion, the Commission's decision 
will be reviewed for correctness.58 
There is no explicit grant of authority regarding 
the question of what constitutes "equipment" under section 
59-12-104(16). It is also true that the precise question at 
issue cannot be resolved using traditional methods of 
statutory construction. The usual meaning of the term 
"equipment" is fixed assets of a business enterprise not 
including real property and buildings.59 This, however, 
does not resolve the issue. Morton does not claim that 
buildings should qualify as an exemption under section 
59-12-104(16). Rather, Morton's argument is that the shells 
of its production facilities are so specialized and so 
intricately connected to the function of the machinery that 
they do not constitute buildings, in the traditional sense, 
but are essentially equipment. The other terms of the 
statute are not helpful, and the legislative history is not, 
as in the case of section 59-12-104(15), specific enough to 
provide much guidance.60 
Indeed, it seems that the legislature left 
unresolved the more general question of whether structures 
having characteristics of real property as well as 
characteristics of equipment can qualify for an exemption 
58. Sfifi Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). 
59. Sea Webster's New Third International Dictionary 768 
(14th ed. 1961). 
60. The legislative history of section 59-12-104(16) suggests 
that the section was enacted to provide incentives for the 
expansion of manufacturing plants. Morton claims that since 
the act was meant to provide incentives to manufacturers, the 
term "equipment" should be given an expansive interpretation; 
such an assertion is controverted by the rule that tax 
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed. See Parson 
ASphgU Prods. InqT/ 617 P.2d at 398; Great Salt Lake 
Minerals, 573 P.2d at 340; Salt Lake County, 548 P.2d at 631. 
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under section 59-12-104(16), let alone the more specific 
issue asserted in this appeal. It should also be noted that 
the classification of a structure as real property or 
equipment is the type of determination the Commission 
routinely performs. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the legislature granted the Commission discretion in this 
area. Given these facts, we conclude that the Commission has 
been granted discretion in interpreting the term "equipment." 
The decision of the Commission, therefore, will only be 
overturned if it is unreasonable.61 
In determining whether the Commission's decision is 
reasonable, it must be noted that the Commission has promul-
gated a rule that expressly excludes real property and 
improvements to real property from the definition of 
equipment, as that term is used in section 59-12-104(16). 
Rule 865-19-85S provides: 
2. "Equipment" means any independent 
device separated from any machinery but 
essential to an integrated or continuous 
manufacturing or assembling process or any 
sub unit thereof . . . . 
B. Application of Exemption: 
1. The machinery and equipment 
exemption applies only to tangible personal 
property. It does not apply to real 
property or to tangible personal property 
which is purchased and becomes an 
improvement to real property. 
Morton does not challenge the propriety of rule 865-19-85S. 
In fact, Morton's argument relies heavily on the language of 
the rule.62 
61. See suora notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
62. Because Morton asserts that the Commission erred in 
interpreting section 59-12-104(16), the Commission's 
determination must be reviewed under section 64-46b-16(4)(d) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Morton's argument, 
however, relies more on the wording of rule 865-19-85S than on 
the language of section 59-12-104(16). The instant case, 
therefore, may present a situation more appropriately reviewed 
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, i.e., the agency's action is "contrary to a 
rule of the agency," rather than under section 64-46b-16(4)(d). 
Morton has not asserted this claim. In any event, since we 
have already held that the Commission has been granted 
(Continued on page 19.) 
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Morton argues that because the term "equipment" is 
not defined in the tax code or Utah case law, this court 
should look to other jurisdictions for guidance. 
Specifically/ Morton cites cases from Wisconsin63 and the 
federal bench64 that have focused on the function that the 
particular structure performs in determining if the structure 
should be considered equipment.6^ it is argued that we 
should adopt this approach because it was developed under 
statutes that are similar to rule 865-19-85S, that is, tax 
statutes granting exemptions for machinery and equipment but 
not for building or building structures.6^ Implicit in 
Morton's argument is the assertion that under a functional 
analysis, the facilities in question would qualify as 
equipment. 
There are, however, many difficulties with Morton's 
argument. It is rule 865-19-85S, not section 59-12-104(16), 
that is similar to the statutes cited by Morton. Yet Morton 
has cited no cases where this court has looked to another 
jurisdiction's statutes to aid in the interpretation of an 
agency's rule. In situations like the instant case, where 
the Commission has been granted discretion to interpret the 
term -equipment" and therefore discretion in interpreting 
rule 865-19-85S,67 other jurisdictions' rulings are not as 
salient as they may be in situations dealing with strict 
(Footnote 62 continued.) 
discretion in interpreting the term -equipment,* as used in 
section 59-12-104(16), and rule 865-19-85S defines the term at 
issue, it is clear that in this case a reasonableness standard 
should be used under either section of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See supra notes 18-20, 36-37, and accompanying 
text. See generally Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v, 
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982); Utah Hotel Co, v, 
Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467, 470 (1944). 
63. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Citv of Milwaukee, 125 Wis. 2d 437, 
373 N.W.2d 680, 687-89 (Ct. App. 1985); Ladish Malting Co. v. 
Wisconsin Deo't of Revenue. 98 Wis. 2d 496, 297 N.W.2d 56, 62 
(Ct. App. 1980). 
64. Thirup v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 508 F.2d 915, 
918 (9th Cir. 1974). 
65. Morton asserts that under the functional analysis the 
determination of whether property is equipment or real property 
is made using a three-step approach: first, annexation (how 
is the property attached?); second, adaptation (what is the 
function or purpose of the property?); and third, intent (did 
the owner intend the property to remain tangible personal 
property permanently attached to real estate, or did the owner 
intend the property to be real property?). 
66. See Thirup, 915 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing Co.. 373 
N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co.. 297 N.W.2d at 56. 
67. See generally Concerned Parents of Stepchildren, 645 P.2d 
at 633; Utah Hotel Co., 151 P.2d at 470. 
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statutory construction. Furthermore, though there are 
similarities between rule 865-19-85S and the statutes Morton 
cites, the statutes and rule 865-19-85S are not identical. 
None of the statutes upon which Morton relies involve sales 
and use tax. Moreover, under rule 865-19-85S, the tax 
exemption does not apply to real property and improvements to 
real property, while under the statutes Morton cites the tax 
exemption does not apply to the arguably narrower term of 
buildings and building structures.°8 
We also note that the case law from other 
jurisdictions is at best conflicting in this area.69 There 
are jurisdictions that have not followed a functional approach 
in interpreting similar statutes.70 Furthermore, the 
jurisdictions that have adopted a functional approach have 
reached conflicting conclusions.71 Therefore, even if we 
held that section 59-12-104(16) contemplates a functional 
approach in determining whether a structure was equipment or 
real property, it would not necessarily follow that Morton's 
facilities would constitute equipment. It was established at 
the hearing that the functional analysis urged by Morton is 
often "very nebulous.- Indeed, it is entirely possible that 
the Commission agreed with Morton's approach but disagreed 
with Morton's conclusion. 
Given the language of rule 865-19-85S, the 
discrepancies between rule 865-19-85S and the statutes Morton 
cites, and the conflicting case law, the Commission's 
determination that the shells of Morton's facilities do not 
constitute equipment is not unreasonable. Therefore, the 
Commission's determination will not be disturbed. 
68. See Thirup, 508 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing Co.. 373 
N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co., 297 N.W.2d at 56. 
69. The Commission cites several cases which define the term 
"real property." Under these definitions, it is clear that 
Morton's facilities would qualify as real property. Thus, 
they would not qualify for an exemption under rule 
865-19-85S. See National Lead Co. v. Borough of Sayerville, 
132 N.J. Super. 30, 331 A.2d 633, 637 (1975); Strobel v. 
Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins., 152 N.W.2d 794, 796 (N.D. 1967); In 
re Inolis, 69 Okla. 64, 169 P. 1083, 1084 (1917); Sanchez v. 
Brandt, 567 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. 1978). 
70. 5£fi Ggeeo Circle Growers inc, v, Lorain County Bfly of 
Revision, 35 Ohio St. 3d 38, 517 N.E.2d 899, 900 (1988). 
71. Compare Thirup, 508 P.2d at 920 (under functional 
approach, greenhouse constitutes equipment) with Busch v. 
County of Hennepin, 380 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1986) (under 
functional approach greenhouse does not constitute 
equipment). See also Crown Coco Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 336 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 1983) (metal canopy over 
gasoline pumps does not constitute equipment). 
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III. SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) 
Morton also claims that it is entitled to relief 
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)/ which provides for 
judicial relief when the "agency action is . . . contrary to 
the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency." Neither 
Morton nor the Commission has cited any case law relating to 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Indeed, it appears that there 
is no Utah case law that follows an approach analogous to the 
approach set out in this section. Moreover, the legislative 
history concerning this section is confused and therefore not 
helpful in interpreting the section.72 Given these facts, 
we do not engage in an in-depth analysis of the section. 
Morton claims that the Commission, in determining 
that the shells of its production facilities are real prop-
erty, took action that was contrary to its prior practice of 
characterizing similar structures as tangible personal 
property. This allegation is based on the testimony of 
Mr. Anderson, an auditor who had formerly worked for the tax 
Commission who testified that he was aware of various 
instances where walls, flooring, and roofs of automatic 
storage facilities and large oil storage tanks were treated as 
tangible personal property. The Commission, in determining 
that the facilities in question are real property, did not 
distinguish the instant case from situations involving 
automatic storage facilities or oil storage tanks. The 
question presented, therefore, is whether Mr. Anderson's 
testimony establishes prior inconsistent agency practice for 
the purpose of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). If the testimony 
establishes prior inconsistent agency practice, Morton would 
be entitled- to relief under this section due to the 
Commission's failure to provide a "rational basis for the 
inconsistency.w 
72. The comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory 
Committee state that section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) is patterned 
after section 5-116(8)(iii) of the MSAPA. See Advisory 
Committee at 15. The comment to section 5-116(8)(iii) 
provides that section 5-116(8)(iii) is related to section 
2-103, which requires agencies to make an index of their final 
orders and to make this index available for public inspection 
and copying. Under the MSAPA's scheme, a -party may invoke 
the indexing and public access requirement of Section 2-102, 
for the purpose of ascertaining the agency's prior practice, 
so as to reveal the inconsistency between the challenged 
agency action and prior agency practice." See MSAPA § 5-116, 
comments, 15 U.L.A. at 129. Utah, however, has not enacted a 
provision similar to section 2-102. Due to the conflict 
between this legislative history and Utah's statutory scheme, 
legislative history cannot be relied on to a great extent in 
interpreting section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
21 No. 900325 
In approaching this issue, it is important to note 
the exact nature of the evidence presented at the hearing. 
Mr. Anderson did not testify that the Commission, in a formal 
or informal hearing, classified oil storage tanks and 
automatic storage facilities as tangible personal property. 
Rather, it is apparent from the record that Mr. Anderson was 
referring to individual audits.73 Indeed, he testified that 
the method used in determining that the tanks and storage 
facilities were tangible personal property was "not an 
official guideline." Furthermore, the auditing division did 
not consistently classify such structures as equipment, but 
also classified such structures as real property. This 
inconsistency was due to the fact that there was no 
well-established policy regarding the classification of these 
structures. 
Although there is limited law on point,74 it is 
clear that in the absence of an official guideline or a 
well-established policy, the decisions of auditors do not 
constitute "agency practice" for the purpose of section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).75 To hold otherwise would be to bind 
the Commission by the unappealed decisions of its subordi-
nates. It is the Commission that has been granted authority 
to administer the tax code.76 Morton has provided no 
evidence that the Commission itself has acted contrary to the 
position it has taken in the instant case. Under Morton's 
approach, the mere fact that there is conflict within an 
agency on a particular question would be sufficient to justify 
judicial relief under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Due to 
the presence of a conflict, no matter how the issue is finally 
resolved, the decision will be inconsistent with some of the 
decisions of the agency's lower level employees. In recog-
nizing the Commission's authority to administer the tax code, 
section 63-46b-16 recognizes the Commission's authority over 
its own employees. Since Morton failed to establish prior 
agency practice contrary to the agency's action, the 
Commission's determination cannot be overturned on the basis 
of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
73. Although it is not clear, it appears from the record that 
the classification of these structures as tangible personable 
property occurred in audits concerning Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103, not Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16). 
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
75. It may be important to note that we are not deciding 
whether the classification of oil storage tanks and walls, 
ceilings, and floors of automatic storage facilities as 
tangible personal property is inconsistent with the 
classification of shells of Morton's facilities as real 
property. 
76. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-201 to -210. 
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IV. SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) 
Morton's remaining contention is that the 
Commission's determination that the shells of its production 
facilities do not constitute equipment is not supported by the 
record and is therefore arbitrary and capricious. It is 
argued that for this reason Morton is entitled to relief under 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).77 However, an analysis of the 
section is unnecessary because it is clear that the record 
supports the Commission's determination. 
It is argued that because Morton produced a witness 
who testified that in his opinion the shells of the facilities 
in question constituted equipment and no other witness contra-
dicted this testimony, the Commission is not free to disagree 
with this opinion. Morton's witness formed his opinion by 
applying his interpretation of rule 865-19-85S and section 
59-12-104(16) to the undisputed facts. Since the facts are 
indeed undisputed, his opinion is simply a legal conclusion. 
While the Commission is not free to make findings of fact 
outside the scope of the evidence presented at the hearing,78 
the Commission is free to disagree with the legal conclusions 
offered by witnesses, even when those conclusions are uncontro-
verted. It is undisputed that sufficient factual evidence was 
presented at the hearing, and it has been established that the 
Commission did not abuse its discretion in dealing with 
section 59-12-104(16). The Commission's decision, therefore, 
is supported by the record. 
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the 
Commission did not err in determining that expenditures made 
in the construction of Morton's sodium azide pellets 
facilities do not qualify for an exemption under section 
59-12-104(15) and (16). 
Affirmed. 
r ^ -*"' i 
77. Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) provides for judicial relief 
when an agency's actions are "otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious." 
78. First flat'l Bank of Boston v. County gdt of Equalisation, 
799 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Utah 1990). 
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WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result 
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